Saturday, August 13, 2016

Commission Gets It Wrong in Seat Belt Case

Holding that “shall be required to wear” language in a mine safety standard is equivalent to “shall be worn,” three members of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission have wrongly reversed 42 years of case law and handed regulators a new weapon to use against the coal sector.
 
In a decision July 19, Commission Chairwoman Mary Lu Jordan and Commissioners Patrick Nakamura and William Althen gave six reasons why they believe the language of 30 CFR § 77.1710 mandates that surface coal operators assure their employees wear protective clothing and equipment when appropriate. Their reasoning was not shared by Commissioners Robert Cohen, Jr. and Michael Young.

30 CFR § 77.1710 states that miners “shall be required to wear” protective clothing and devices under circumstances outlined in a number of subsections, including subsection (i), which mandates seat belt use in certain vehicles when there is a danger of overturning and where rollover protection is provided. The subsection is relevant because the case is about a rollover accident involving a 100-ton truck that occurred at the Chestnut Flats Mine in Kentucky in April 2010. The driver, who was not wearing a seat belt, sustained a lost-time injury. The Mine Safety and Health Administration cited Nally & Hamilton (N&H) Enterprises for violating the standard.

Under existing case law predating the 1977 Mine Act, the court has always made a distinction between the “shall be required to wear” language of the standard and “shall be worn.” According to Young, the intent of a 1974 ruling concerning a standard employing the same “shall be required to wear” phrasing was to forgive the operator’s liability if the infraction was solely due to the miner’s negligence or disobedience. In the N&H case, MSHA’s own accident investigator admitted the driver had been negligent.

A post-Mine Act decision, Southwestern Illinois Coal Corp., built on the earlier decision. In that 1983 decision, which is known as Southwestern I, Young noted the court majority held that “ ‘[t]he regulation does not state that the operator must guarantee that belts and safety lines are actually worn, but rather says only that each employee shall be required to wear them.’ ” To be in compliance, operators had to have a system in place requiring protective equipment and diligently enforcing its use. The Commission reiterated its position in a similar case in 1985 involving the same company, dubbed Southwestern II.

N&H has a mandatory seat belt use policy backed up by a statement employees must sign prior to hire in which they agree to adhere to the safety policy. The policy is restated during monthly foreman’s safety talks and at annual refresher training, which employees also have to acknowledge by their signature. The driver signed the appropriate form six times from 2004 through 2009. In addition, the operator had disciplined an employee found not to have been in compliance. In another instance, an N&H employee who was wearing a seat belt escaped injury after an accident. Convinced by this evidence that N&H had taken reasonable steps to comply, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) William Moran vacated the citation in July 2013.

In its argument overruling Moran, the majority also referenced Southwestern I, but championed the dissenter’s interpretation that “required” means to mandate, not merely to exhort. “ ‘[T]hat which is required, shall be done. … There is no meaningful, nor even semantically persuasive distinction, between ‘shall be required to wear’ and ‘shall be worn,’ ” the majority wrote, quoting the dissenter.   

The three commissioners said their interpretation also harmonized 77.1710(i) with other sections of Part 77 and with parallel metal/nonmetal regulations. They cited a practical reason to justify their position, and contended their view was consistent with the Mine Act’s strict liability dictate while best achieving the purpose of mining law; namely, to protect miner health and safety.  The majority chose to ignore Young’s comment that nothing prevented MSHA from rewriting the standard if it disagreed with the Commission’s historical interpretation. The group made a similar call on the same day, July 19, regarding fall protection under 1710(g) in another case, Lewis-Goetz & Co., Inc.  

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that settled law is best left alone unless it is unworkable or badly reasoned. Young and Cohen asserted that Southwestern I was neither and that their colleagues had failed to make a case to justify overturning precedent. As a result, Young agreed with the ALJ that the citation should be vacated.

Cohen, however, took another tack. He said he believed N&H could have done more by periodically spot-checking drivers for compliance, and pointed out that N&H’s own safety coordinator had said as much in his testimony. He alone also felt N&H was moderately negligent. Thus, he upheld the ticket. Although Young sided with Moran, he conceded that the very existence of the violation suggested a deficiency in the operator’s approach, and agreed with Cohen a monitoring component should have been employed.

In the end, the Commission remanded the case to Moran for a decision on MSHA’s significant and substantial (S&S) designation of the citation and to set an appropriate financial penalty. They let stand Moran’s finding of no negligence.

In reading the 19-page decision, one admittedly subjective takeaway is that the outcome may well have been orchestrated. Due to clear mitigating circumstances regarding N&H’s diligence in enforcing its seat belt policy, MSHA must surely have known that the $52,500 specially assessed fine it levied would never hold up. Such a ridiculous, baseless amount would surely trigger an appeal, a legal maneuver the agency may well have welcomed if its aim was for a favorable ruling from a pliant Commission. If so, in the interest of transparency, MSHA should admit it was using its special assessment weapon for this novel purpose.

That the outcome may have been foreseen is also suggested by ALJ Moran’s decision to craft an alternative scenario to his vacatur order in case the Commission ruled against him. He said he would uphold the citation, strike the S&S designation and set a $100 fine.

In our view, the Commission majority has replaced a reasonable interpretation of the standard with an unreasonable one; i.e., it has substituted bad law for good law, an opinion held by the minority Commission faction. A higher court may well be totally unsympathetic to stirring up over four decades of settled law without legal justification. If MSHA’s legal strategy was to secure a favorable ruling, it would be sweet retribution indeed if, on appeal, the reviewing tribunal threw out the case. 

One more thing. In writing the Mine Act, Congress made clear its belief that a safe workplace was the joint responsibility of miners and operators, with operators having “primary” responsibility. Section 2(g) reads in pertinent part that “it is the purpose of this Act to establish … mandatory health and safety standards … [and] to require that each operator of a coal or other mine and every miner in such mine comply with such standards …” [emphasis added]. It is time for MSHA to treat miners like the grownups they are and craft standards beyond smoking underground to hold them accountable for unsafe behavior found to have been caused by their negligence or disobedience.


Copyright 2016, James Sharpe, CIH. All Rights Reserved.

Monday, August 1, 2016

POV Process Seen as Factor in Some Mine Shutdowns

The Mine Safety and Health Administration’s Pattern of Violation (POV) enforcement program may have directly triggered the demise of seven underground mines and significantly impacted management decisions to shutter at least some of 23 others.

MSHA’s POV program was launched in 2007. Since then, 89 mines have gotten caught up in the program. Of these, seven have faced the full force of the agency’s dreaded POV enforcement weapon. Only one of the seven, Pocahontas Coal Co.’s Affinity Mine, remains active. Sixteen of the 89 mines are repeat alleged offenders, and three ‒ Rhino Eastern, LLC’s Eagle #1, D & C Mining Corp’s mine of the same name, and Argus Energy WV, LLC’s Deep Mine #8 ‒ have gone around three times. 

Within 12 months after MSHA enforcement began under either a POV or a Potential POV (PPOV) notice, the operators of six coal mines and a Colorado silver mine informed the agency they planned to end active operations. The short time lapse between the launch of enforcement and management’s notice strongly suggests that either heightened enforcement as a result of the POV/PPOV designation or the threat of it played a pivotal role in the decision.

The seven mines are Bledsoe Coal Corp.’s #4; Bardo Mining, LLC’s Bardo #1; GCC Energy’s King I; Snapco, Inc’s Mine No. 2; Coal Riving Mining, LLC’s Fork Creek No. 1; Solid Fuel, Inc.’s No. 1; and Star Mine Operations, LLC’s Revenue Mine. All are abandoned underground coal operations, except Revenue, which is listed in MSHA’s mine retrieval system as a nonproducing underground silver mine. The Fork Creek and Revenue mines were POV designees.

The 23 other mines went dark 12-36 months after MSHA’s POV/PPOV enforcement hammer began, a time frame also sufficiently short to suggest enforcement impacted management’s inactivation decision. This is especially so for mines whose status changed within 16 months: The New West Virginia Mining Co.’s Apache; Manalapan Mining Co.’s RB #12; Commonwealth Mining, LLC’s No. 1 Washer; Excel Mining, LLC’s Mine No. 2; and Brody Mining, LLC’s No. 1. As with the seven mines above, all these are underground coal mines with one exception: Commonwealth’s Washer plant is a facility coal operation. Brody No. 1, now listed as nonproducing, made MSHA’s POV list.

The most notorious PPOV mine is Performance Coal’s Upper Big Branch-South (UBB) operation, which received the designation in the fall of 2007. By the time of the April 2010 explosion that killed 29 miners, the mine had shed the label. Nevertheless, it should have been relisted in the fall of 2009. After initially denying that UBB had met the PPOV criteria, the agency fessed up eight days following the tragedy after media prodding initiated by the mining newsletter Sharpe’s Point. The oversight was officially attributed to a “computer programming error.” We’ll never know if the disaster could have been prevented as a result of the additional compliance scrutiny a PPOV listing would have triggered. The mine was officially abandoned in September 2012. UBB is in West Virginia, home to 32 of the POV/PPOV designated mines. Kentucky, another Central Appalachian state, had 25.

Of the 77 POV/PPOV listed coal mines, 62 (81%) have gone into temporarily idled (5), nonproducing (16), or abandoned (41) status. While, as noted, MSHA enforcement surely played a role in some of these mines’ demise, the severe downturn plaguing the sector must surely be seen as the most significant driving force behind most of these shutdowns.

In the metal/non-metal (M/NM) sector, besides the Revenue Mine, 13 others have gotten the POV or PPOV tag since 2007. Twelve remain active. Like Revenue, Genesis, Inc’s Troy Mine is another underground silver operation listed as nonproducing. Of the total M/NM group, three are cement plants, nine are metal mines, and two are nonmetal operations: Carmeuse Lime and Stone, Inc.’s Black River lime mine and Celite Corp.’s Lompoc Plant, which produces diatomaceous earth.

MSHA’s POV authority derives from Section 104(e) of the Mine Act. The provision is potent in large part because of its potential to severely disrupt mining operations. At POV-listed mines, any inspection within 90 days during which a significant and substantial (S&S) violation is written results in an order withdrawing personnel from areas of the mine affected by the alleged violation until it is abated. An S&S violation is one that could reasonably be expected to lead to a serious injury or illness. The only way to become delisted is to go through an inspection free of S&S citations or to have no withdrawal orders issued within 90 days of the date of the POV notice.

MSHA’s implementing regulation went into effect in 1991. However, it was not enforced until three underground mine tragedies in 2006 that killed 19 coal miners focused renewed attention on mine safety. Under the regulation, mines with a high number of significant and substantial (S&S) violations were notified that they had the potential to become listed as POV mines. Any mine so designated was expected to develop and implement a corrective action plan to cut its S&S violation frequency rate. Over the next 90 days, MSHA monitored the mine for improvement and if it fell short, it was issued a POV notice. However, because just one mine received the POV black mark, the regulation was judged as ineffective.

As a result, the rule was amended, with the changes going into effect in March 2013. A significant change allowed MSHA to invoke a POV listing for alleged S&S citations. Under the previous iteration, only S&S violations that had become final orders were counted. The agency made the change because it believed some operators delayed judgment day on the S&S allegations against them through litigation. In fact, the POV status of the one mine placed on pattern status under the old system was removed when it successfully fought some of the S&S citations after exercising its due process right to challenge them. The new rule also removed the PPOV process altogether, replacing it with an on-line tool every operator could monitor to independently check the POV status of their mine. The amended rule also established general criteria and procedures MSHA would use to identify pattern mines. A coalition of mine operators sued MSHA over its new procedures, and that litigation remains ongoing.

No mine was identified for POV status this year, a testament to improved compliance, according to MSHA, which credits the regulation and a “culture change” in the industry for the achievement. However, the overwhelming majority of the POV/PPOV listed mines, 68 in all, have been underground coal operations, a mining subsector especially hard hit by tough economic times. These mines operate in a complex, highly regulated environment that makes alleged S&S tickets more likely. It’s certainly good news that MSHA came up empty in its screening for POV mines this year. But let’s not get carried away; the agency simply had far fewer mines from the underground coal sector to draw from.


Copyright 2016, James Sharpe, CIH. All Rights Reserved.